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NOTES
The Interaction of the Doctrine
of Reasonable Expectations and
Ambiguity in Drafting: The Development
of the Kentucky Formulation
BY AMY D. CUBBAGE*
INTRODUCTION
The Company will pay on behalf of the Insured all sums which the
Insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages because of
B. property damage
to which this insurance applies ....
Exclusions[:]
This insurance does not apply: ...
(i) to property damage to...
(3) property in the care, custody or control of the Insured or
as to which the Insured is for any purpose exercising physical
control;...
(1) to property damage to the Named Insured's products arising out
of such products or any part of such products;
(m) to property damage to work performed by or on behalf of the
Named Insured arising out of the work or any portion thereof, or
out of materials, parts or equipment furnished in connection
therewith;
(n) to damages claimed for the withdrawal, inspection, repair,
replacement, or loss of use of the Named Insured's products or
work completed by or for the Named Insured or of any property of
which such products or work form a part, if such products, work
* J.D. expected 1997, University of Kentucky College of Law; B.A. 1994,
Georgetown College.
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or property are withdrawn from the market or from use because of
any known or suspected defect or deficiency therein.
A typical commercial liability policy, such as the one quoted
above, confronts a small business owner with complex and
opaque language. Undoubtedly, most people would find the quoted
passage unintelligible if they took the time to read it. Given the incom-
prehensibility of the language in many insurance policies, it is not
surprising that most people do not even bother to read their policies.2
What is surprising is that the court handling the litigation concerning the
above-quoted policy found this language unambiguous as a matter of
law.3
Given the generally accepted belief that insurance contracts hold
hidden problems for the individual buyers,4 courts developed rules
'Biebel Bros., Inc. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 522 F.2d 1207,
1209 (8th Cir. 1975) (omissions in original). The quoted language is from a
commercial liability policy issued to the plaintiff in that case by the defendant
insurer. This is typical of language found in commercial liability policies.
2 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 cmt. b (1979) ("A
party who makes regular use of a standardized form of agreement does not
ordinarily expect his customers to understand or even to read the standard
terms.... Customers do not in fact ordinarily understand or even read the
standard terms.").
' Biebel Bros., 522 F.2d at 1211. Decisions such as this set the stage for
the problem addressed in this Note: if a court requires a prerequisite showing of
ambiguity for an application of the doctrine of reasonable expectations, then
BiebelBros. could effectivelypreclude its application to an insurance policy even
if the language is at wide variance with the reasonable expectations of the
insured party.
4 This Note will refer only to insurance contracts though much of the
applicable law could be used with standardized contracts in general. Some
jurisdictions have gone the added step of applying the doctrine of reasonable
expectations to standardized contracts in general rather than limiting it to
insurance contracts. See, e.g., Broemmer v. Otto, 821 P.2d 204, 208 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1991) (applying the doctrine to a contract between an abortion provider and
a patient), approved in part, vacated in part sub nom. Broemmer v. Abortion
Servs. of Phoenix, Ltd., 840 P.2d 1013 (Ariz. 1992). To date, Kentucky has
applied the doctrine only to insurance contracts. For a discussion of Kentucky
cases applying the doctrine, see infra notes 94-122 and accompanying text. It is
not clear if Kentucky courts will apply the doctrine to a wider range of adhesion
contracts.
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applicable to the interpretation of these policies.5 This occurred for
two reasons. First, courts have accepted the fact that buyers of insur-
ance do not read their contracts, while scholars promoted the theory
that the buyer should not reasonably be expected to do so.6 Second,
courts were concerned with overreaching by insurance companies and a
lack of bargaining power on the part of the individual insurance
buyer. By and large, insurance companies offer buyers standardized
contracts on a "take-it-or-leave-it" 7 basis. This may appear to afford the
buyer bargaining power in the sense that he or she can simply go to
another insurance agent and find a better offer, but there is little
variation from policy to policy. This choice ultimately appears to be
illusory.'
To address the problems prevalent with standardized contracts, courts
have applied the doctrine of reasonable expectations. Over the past three
decades courts have developed this doctrine as an alternative to the usual
rules of contract interpretation.9 Unfortunately, the development of the
5 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 cmt. c (1979); E.
ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 4.26 (2d ed. 1990).
6 Courts decided to develop an interpretive tool incorporating the prevalent
belief that the "purchasing" party to a standardized contract does not read the
terms. In so doing, they rejected the traditional rule that parties are bound to a
contract regardless of whether or not they read the actual contract. This is
prudential because it is more efficient for society generally, and for the parties
in particular (especially insurance companies), to draft standardized policies and
offer them to buyers on a "take-it-or-leave-it"basis. FARNSWORTH, supra note
5, § 4.26, at 312. The standardization and the absence of bargaining reduces
transaction costs and lowers the overall cost of insurance. If courts imposed an
obligation on the buyer to read what could be a 100-page commercial liability
contract, the benefits of standardizationwould be obliterated. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 cmt. a (1979) and FARNSWORTH, supra note 5,
§ 4.26 for a discussion of the benefits of standardization and the danger of
imposing increased transaction costs.
7 FARNSWORTH, supra note 5, at 312.
8 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 cmt. c (1979).
9 The genesis of the doctrine has often been traced to the California
Supreme Court decision in Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 419 P.2d 168 (Cal. 1966)
and to Professor Keeton's important early law review article on the subject. See
Robert Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at Variance With Policy Provisions, 83
HARV. L. REv. 961 (1970) (Part I) and 83 HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1970) (Part II).
For a good overview of the history behind the judicial institution of the doctrine,
see generallyKenneth S. Abraham, Judge-madeLaw and Judge-made Insurance:
437
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doctrine has not been relatively uniform from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.
A split has developed in part over whether courts should impose the
requirement of a finding of an ambiguity in the language before applying
the doctrine. Some jurisdictions allow a party to a standardized insurance
policy to invoke the protections of the doctrine whether or not the
language is ambiguous; others require that the language be ambiguous
before the doctrine can come into play.'"
This Note will examine the development of the doctrine of reason-
able expectations in Kentucky through a comparison to the Restatement's
approach." Part I will examine the doctrine of ambiguity, a related
interpretational tool that in some instances is virtually indistinguish-
able from the doctrine of reasonable expectations.' 2 Part II will detail
the mechanics, judicial interpretations, and critiques of the Restate-
ment (Second) version of the doctrine of reasonable expectations as
well as its connection to the doctrine of ambiguity. The Restatement
version dispenses with any requirement that a fact finder determine
that the policy language is ambiguous before the doctrine can apply.' 3
Part IEI will look at and critique the development of the Kentucky
formulation of the doctrine and its interaction with the doctrine of
ambiguity. In contrast to the Restatement, Kentucky requires the
party challenging the policy language to show that the policy is
ambiguous before a court may apply the doctrine of reasonable
expectations.' Finally, this Note will conclude by comparing the
relative strengths and weaknesses of the two approaches and advocating
the Restatement approach, because it is more protective of policy holders'
interests.' 5
Honoring the Reasonable Expectations of the Insured, 67 VA. L. REV. 1151
(1981).
,0 There have been a number of law review articles and student notes on the
general subject of this doctrine. For a thorough overview of the various
interpretations given to the doctrine in different jurisdictions, see Laurie K. Fett,
Note, The Reasonable Expectations Doctrine: An Alternative to Bending and
Stretching Traditional Tools of Contract Interpretation, 18 WM. MITCHELL L.
REV. 1113, 1123-24 nn.64-65 (1992).
" See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 (1979).
12 See infra notes 16-31 and accompanying text.
13 See infra notes 32-90 and accompanying text.
14 See infra notes 91-138 and accompanying text.
'" See infra notes 139-41 and accompanying text.
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I. THE DocTRNE OF AMBIGUrIY
The doctrine of ambiguity' 6 is a general tool of contract interpreta-
tion, but it has been most notably applied in the context of adhesion
contracts, which are especially common in the insurance industry.
7
Most simply, the doctrine of ambiguity states that an ambiguous term will
be construed against the drafter of the disputed language.'" In other
words, if there is a term in a contract susceptible to more than one
interpretation, a court, in interpreting the term, will choose the interpreta-
tion that works most to the benefit of the party that did not write the
contract. The purpose behind this doctrine is to encourage the drafter to
take care not to include ambiguous terms and to penalize the drafter in
such circumstances. 9
This doctrine has particular importance in the interpretation of
insurance contracts. With a normal bargained-for contract, there are some
questions about the need for the doctrine since both parties would have
had some input into the terms.2" This safeguard is not present with an
insurance contract since the insured normally has no input into the
contractual terms beyond a request that certain coverage be provided.2
The doctrine of ambiguity can protect against overreaching on the part of
insurance companies by giving the insured the benefit of the terms over
which the insured has no control.22
16 This doctrine is also commonly known under the name contra profer-
entum, but this Note will refer to the doctrine by its English name. See
FARNSWORTH, supra note 5, § 7.11, at 518-19.
,7 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 206 cmt. a (1979); Joseph
E. Minnock, Comment, Protecting the Insured from an Adhesion Insurance
Policy: The Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations in Utah, 1991 UTAH L. REv.
837, 844.
18 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 206 (1979); Wolford
v. Wolford, 662 S.W.2d 835, 838 (Ky. 1984).
19 See FARNSWORTH, supra note 5, § 7.11.
20 In this situation there is no party who would have gained the advantage
from a favorable construction of a term. Since the premise underlying the
doctrine of ambiguity is that the party drafting the language has a motive to draft
in its favor, the doctrine should not apply in this situation. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 206 cmt. a (1979) ("[W]here one party chooses the
terms of a contract, he is likely to provide more carefully for the protection of
his own interests than for those of the other party.").
2 See supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text.
22 See, e.g., Wolford, 662 S.W.2d at 838 ("If the contract has two construc-
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Unfortunately, courts have not been consistent in applying the doc-
trine of ambiguity. Decisions range from a refusal to apply the doctrine
unless there is a patent ambiguity23 to a willingness to apply the doctrine
even if there is no ambiguity in the language, either latent or patent.24
Courts often find an ambiguity just to reach a more equitable result.
Therefore, in a "narrow" jurisdiction, the doctrine of ambiguity is at best
an unreliable protection for the insured since there is no guarantee that
the insured will find a judge willing to protect her interests under the
doctrine.25 People with arguably valid claims against an insurance
company, where there was some obvious overreaching on the part of the
insurer, may not have any recourse if their jurisdiction adheres to the
narrower interpretation of the doctrine of ambiguity.
One may gain a better understanding of the debate over the doctrine
of ambiguity through a comparison to the debate concerning the parol
evidence rule. The parol evidence rule states that extrinsic evidence,
usually of prior negotiations, is not admissible in interpreting a fully
integrated contract unless the language of the contract is ambiguous.26
Though the rule seems clear and straightforward, it has triggered a
debate over the meaning to be placed on the word "ambiguous." This
conflict has led to the development of two prevailing views. The
traditional view, most normally associated with Williston, is that the
ambiguity must be patent. In other words, the ambiguity must appear on
the face of the document for parol evidence to be admissible.2 The
competing view, associated with Corbin, is that an ambiguity may be
latent for parol evidence to be admissible. Not only may parol evidence
be introduced to interpret a clause that is ambiguous on its face, but
parol evidence also may be admissible to show that a term that appears
unambiguous is, in fact, not as clear as one would think from a reading
of the document.28
tions, the one most favorable to the insured must be adopted.").
23 See FARNSWORTH, supra note 5, § 7.3, at 474. Kentucky takes this narrow
approach and requires a patent ambiguity. See, e.g., Wolford, 662 S.W.2d at 835.
See infra notes 26-31 and accompanying text for a more thorough discussion of
patent and latent ambiguities.
24 See Minnock, supra note 17, at 845 (explaining that courts have created
ambiguity where none existed in an effort to circumvent the ambiguity
requirement).
2 Id.
26 FARNSWORTH, supra note 5, § 7.3.
27 Id.
28 id.
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While the Restatement generally reflects the Corbin approach,29
Kentucky adheres to the traditional Willistonian version of the parol
evidence rule. In Kentucky, parol evidence is only admissible if the
contractual language is patently ambiguous or if there are allegations of
fraud or mutual mistake.3" Logically, Kentucky has also adopted the
restricted doctrine of ambiguity.3
I. THE RESTATEMENT DocrRiNE
A. Mechanics of the Restatement Formulation
The drafters of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts included what
they considered to be a model version of the doctrine of reasonable
expectations in section 211:
(1) Except as stated in Subsection (3), where a party to an agreement
signs or otherwise manifests assent to a writing and has reason to
believe that like writings are regularly used to embody terms of
agreements of the same type, he adopts the writing as an integrated
agreement with respect to the terms included in the writing.
(2) Such a writing is interpreted wherever reasonable as treating alike
all those similarly situated, without regard to their knowledge or
understanding of the standard terms of the writing.
(3) Where the other party has reason to believe that the party manifest-
ing such assent would not do so if he knew that the writing contained
a particular term, the term is not part of the agreement. 2
29 id.
30 See O.P. Link Handle Co. v. Wright, 429 S.W.2d 842, 847 (Ky. 1968)
(holding that, in deference to the "stability and a salutary confidence in the
written word," the parol evidence rule precludes the introduction of parol
evidence where mere mistake is claimed, but that an exception may apply in
"true cases of fraud and deceit" and certain kinds of mistakes); Woodward v.
Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 239 S.W.2d 267, 269 (Ky. 1951) ("turning to the...
policy .... we find that the language is clear and unequivocal.. .", therefore
precluding parol evidence).
" See, e.g., Wolford v. Wolford, 662 S.W.2d 835, 837-38 (Ky. 1984).
32 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 (1979). The title of this
section is "Standardized Agreements," indicating that it applies to standardized
contracts in general, not just insurance contracts.
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These three subsections work together to permit a fully integrated33
agreement for purposes of the parol evidence rule 4 even if the non-
drafting party did not actually assent 5 to all the terms in the agreement.
At the same time, section 211 places substantial limitations on the scope
of the agreement. Each subsection plays a distinct role in fulfilling these
purposes. Subsection 1 provides the general rule that standardized
contracts are permissible and enforceable notwithstanding the fact that
they typically contain terms that are not bargained-for and to which there
has been no affirmative assent.36 This rule implicitly assumes that there
are form contracts, such as insurance contracts, that parties may not read.
Subsection 2 sets out the rule that an enforceable standardized contract
must be exactly that - standardized. Terms are interpreted the same for
every buyer of insurance regardless of his or her knowledge of the
presence of the terms or their implication.37
Subsection 3 forms the heart of the doctrine of reasonable expecta-
tions. Within the broader scheme of section 211, it limits subsection 1
terms that are not bargained-for and circumscribes the overall enforceabil-
ity of standardized contracts. Subsection 3 excludes from the enforceable
scope of the standardized document contractual terms that "are beyond
the range of reasonable expectations." '38 Terms "beyond the range of
reasonable expectations" are those that "the other party has reason to
believe that the adhering party'would not have accepted ... had [the
party] known that the agreement contained the particilar term."39
3' An integrated agreement is one in which the parties intend the written
document to be a final or complete version of the agreement. An integrated
agreement may be either partially or completely integrated. See FARNSWORTH,
supra note 5, § 7.3.
" See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text.
3' Assent is a vital part of the contractual process. Normally, one must agree
to the terms of a contract for there to be the requisite offer and acceptance
leading to an enforceable contract. For a good discussion of assent, see generally
FARNSWORTH, supra note 5, §§ 3.6-3.15.
36 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 cmt. b (1979).
37 Id. § 211 cmt. e ("One who assents to standard contract terms normally
assumes that others are doing likewise and that all who do so are on equal
footing.").
38 Id. § 211 cmt. f.
31 Id. Comment f goes on to flesh out indicators of a term beyond the
reasonable expectations of the adhering party. Some of these include "the fact
that the term is bizarre or oppressive, from the fact that it eviscerates the non-
standard terms explicitly agreed to, or from the fact that it eliminates the
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Illustration 6 in the commentary to section 211 is a good example of
the application of the doctrine of reasonable expectations to the insurance
context.40 This hypothetical situation is set up as follows:
A ships goods via B, a carrier. B carries an insurance policy with
C, an insurance company, and with C's authority [B] issues to A a
certificatethat A's shipment is insured under the policy [between B and
C and apparently subject to the terms of that agreement]. The policy
contains a clause excluding coverage of trips on the Great Lakes unless
approved by D, an individual, but this clause is not referred to in the
certificate or known to A. It is not part of the contract between A and
C.
4 1
If not for the exception created by subsection 3, this contract term would
normally be enforceable against A even though A had no way of
knowing about the term. Note that this contract term was completely
unambiguous and that C, the insurer, is in no way at fault for the failure
to inform A of the term since B drafted the certificate.42
Through this framework, a court may invalidate any term of a
standardized agreement that falls under subsection 3 while leaving intact
under subsection 1 an otherwise fully enforceable agreement that is not
subject to parol evidence (assuming the terms are unambiguous). The
entire framework of section 211 allows for the enforcement of what are
very common, useful agreements while at the same time protecting the
non-drafting party from unreasonable terms.
There is little interaction between the Restatement formulation of the
doctrine of reasonable expectations and the doctrine of ambiguity.43
Though they may both apply in a given situation, there is no requirement
that contractual language be ambiguous for the doctrine of reasonable
expectations to apply. A disputed term only needs to be one that falls
dominant purpose of the transaction." Id.
40 See id. § 211 cmt. f, illus. 6.
41 Id.
42 See id.
41 See id. § 206. This Restatement formulation of the doctrine of ambiguity
states that "[i]n choosing among the reasonable meanings of a promise or
agreement or a term thereof, that meaning is generally preferred which operates
against the party who supplies the words or from whom a writing otherwise
proceeds." Id. See supra notes 16-31 and accompanying text for a fuller
discussion of the doctrine of ambiguity.
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outside of reasonable expectations for the protections of subsection 3 to
come into play.
The interaction of the two doctrines can be represented graphically.
Figure 1
1. Contractual terms to which
only the doctrine of reasonable
expectations applies.
2. Contractual terms to which
only the doctrine of ambiguity
applies.
3. Contractual terms to which
both doctrines apply.
'For example, a contractual term could be (1) unambiguous and outside
the realm of reasonable expectations, (2) ambiguous but any reasonable
interpretation of the term would comport with reasonable expectations, or
(3) ambiguous but the most preferential interpretation for the insured
would still fall outside of reasonable expectations. Terms in the first
category would be subject only to the doctrine of reasonable expectations,
and any unreasonable terms would be excised from the document. Terms
in the second category would be affected by the doctrine of ambiguity,
and the ambiguous term would be construed to the benefit of the insured.
Both doctrines would apply to terms in the third category, presumably
with the doctrine of ambiguity determining the true meaning of the term,
and the doctrine of reasonable expectations determining whether the term
may stand as a part of the policy.
B. Judicial Interpretations
Few jurisdictions have jumped on the Restatement bandwagon. Only
Arizona has explicitly adopted the Restatement version of the doctrine of
[VOL. 85
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reasonable expectations,' though the Restatement formulation has had
some success in other jurisdictions, such as Utah45 and Iowa.46 The
Arizona, Utah, and Iowa interpretations help to explain the scope and
application of the Restatement formulation.
1. Arizona
The Arizona Supreme Court formally adopted the Restatement
formulation in its decision in Darner Motor Sales, Inc. v. Universal
Underwriters Insurance Co.4 1 In so doing, the Arizona Supreme Court
accepted the policy foundations and judgments of the Restatement
formulation.48 In Darner, the insured, Darner Motor Sales and its owner,
Joel Darner, bought automobile liability coverage from Universal
Underwriters through its agent, Doxsee. This policy had limits of
$100,000 per injury/$300,000 per accident for Darner and $15,000!
$30,000 limits for lessees.49
Though there was a factual dispute on this matter, Darner apparently
attempted to raise the lessee coverage to the $100,000/$300,000 level. In
reliance on what Darner thought was a successful policy change, he
" See infra notes 47-68 and accompanying text. See Fett, supra note 10, for
an overview of the state of the doctrine of reasonable expectations in a number
of jurisdictions across the country. Fett breaks the various jurisdictions into three
categories: (a) those that accept the Keeton Approach (a liberal approach
comparable to the Restatement approach), (b) jurisdictions that take a more
restrictive approach, and (c) jurisdictions that reject the doctrine outright. Fett
places Kentucky in the category of the more liberal approach, but Kentucky is
better categorizedas ajurisdiction that places strict limitations on the applicabili-
ty of the doctrine. See infra notes 91-141.
41 See infra notes 69-74 and accompanying text.
46 See infra notes 75-80 and accompanying text.
4' Darner Motor Sales, Inc. v. Universal Underwriters Ins., 682 P.2d 388
(Ariz. 1984). This case also had implications for the parol evidence rule in
Arizona. The state had previously begun a move toward the more liberal Corbin
formulation of the parol evidence rule and the Darner court solidified the
doctrine's hold over the contract law of the state. See Robert L. Gottsfield,
Darner Motor Sales v. Universal Underwriters: Corbin, Williston and the
Continued Viability of the Parol Evidence Rule in Arizona, 25 ARIz. ST. L.J. 377
(1993).
48 See supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text for a discussion of some of
the policy justifications for the doctrine of reasonable expectations; see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 cmt. c-f (1979).49 Darner, 682 P.2d at 390.
445
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placed a clause in his rental agreement stating that Darner had insurance
coverage for lessees at the higher limits. However, when he received the
renewal policy, the limits were still at the $15,000/$30,000 level.50
When he complained, Doxsee told him that his umbrella policy with
Underwriters would make up the difference in coverage."
A little less than two years later, one of Darner's lessees negligently
injured a pedestrian. The lessee's rental agreement stated the policy limits
as $100,000/$300,000, but Underwriters claimed that the policy limits
were fixed at the $15,000/$30,000 level and that the umbrella policy did
not cover this injury. The injured party sued Darner under the limits
stated in the rental agreement. Darner filed a third-party complaint against
Underwriters and Doxsee 2 In the litigation, the trial court granted
summary judgment for Universal and Doxsee.53 The Arizona Court of
Appeals affirmed, stating that Darner had made no showing that the
policy was ambiguous i its denial of coverage, thus foreclosing any
alternative interpretations of the policy.
54
The Arizona Supreme Court reversed and adopted the Restatement
version of the doctrine of reasonable expectations.55 That court relied on
the policy considerations found in the Restatement's commentary section
to justify incorporating the rule into state law.56 The Darner court was
concerned with balancing the interests in creating binding, enforceable
contracts with controlling the discretion of standardized agreements'
drafters:
The rule ... recognizes reality and the needs of commerce; it allows
businesses that use such forms to write their own contract. It charges the
51 Id. Neither Darner nor his office manager actually read the terms of the
policies involved in this case. The policies were quite large and consisted of
loose-leaf pages in a three-ring binder. Doxsee would even come to Darner's
place of business and remove and add pages to the binder. Id. at 391.
51 Id.
52 Id.
51 Id. Since the trial court disposed of the case on summary judgment, there
were insufficient factual findings for the Supreme Court to directly apply the
doctrine to the facts. The Supreme Court had to remand for an application of the
doctrine after there were factual findings but it gave an outline of possible
theories of recovery and outcomes. Id. at 399-405.
S4 Id. at 391-92.
5- Id. at 396-99.
56 Id. at 396. The court took judicial notice of the belief that standardized
contracts foster efficiency and are subject to abuse by insurance companies.
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customer with knowledge that the contract being "purchased" is or
contains a form applied to a vast number of transactions and includes
terms which are unknown (or even unknowable); it binds the customer
to such terms. However, the rule stops short of granting the drafter of
the contract license to accomplish any result .... [I]t does not give
effect to boilerplate terms which are contrary to either the expressed
agreement or the purpose of the transaction as known to the contracting
parties.5 7
Implicit in the Darner court's analysis was the premise that there is
no requirement of ambiguity in the Restatement formulation. The Arizona
Court of Appeals held that, for purposes of the appeals process, the
policy at issue was not ambiguous.5" Since the Arizona Supreme Court
could not consider the policy ambiguous given earlier findings, the
Darner court, in accepting the Restatement doctrine, rejected the idea that
ambiguity is required as a threshold consideration in its application.59
The Arizona Supreme Court later explicitly ruled that ambiguity is
not a prerequisite to an application of the doctrine in Gordinier v. Aetna
Casualty & Surety Co.6  The Arizona Court of Appeals had refused to
apply the doctrine to an unambiguous definition in an underinsured
motorist policy extending coverage only to family members that were
"'resident[s] of the same household."' 6 The family member of the
named insured was his estranged wife.62 The Arizona Supreme Court
reversed on the issue of ambiguity. Relying on a line of cases beginning
with Darner, the Gordinier court listed four situations in which the
Restatement formulation may come into play whether or not the language
is ambiguous: where the terms could not be understood by the average
insured;63 where the terms eviscerated reasonably expected coverage and
there was no notice that those terms were present;' where the actions
of the insurer created a reasonable belief of coverage in the insured;65
where the insurer leads the insured to believe that coverage is present in
57 Id. at 398-99.
58 Id. at 391.
59 Note that the court did not specifically reject a requirement of ambiguity
in all cases. See id. at 392, 396-99.
60 Gordinier v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 742 P.2d 277 (Ariz. 1987).
61 Id. at 280.
62 d
63 Id. at 283-84.
64Id. at 284.
65 id.
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the policy that is excluded.66 These situations are consistent with the
examples listed in the Restatement as terms that would trigger the
doctrine.67
Arizona has continued to develop the Restatement formulation of the
doctrine of reasonable expectations since the decision in Darner. There
is currently a large body of case law in Arizona applying the doctrine to
a broad spectrum of standardized contracts even though the doctrine
originated in the insurance context.68 In Arizona, the doctrine of
reasonable expectations is clearly a general contract principle as opposed
to a specialized insurance rule.
2. Utah
Utah explicitly rejected the doctrine of reasonable expectations in
Allen v. Prudential Property and Casualty Insurance Co.69 after some
earlier rulings had essentially adopted the main elements of the Restate-
ment formulation of the doctrine.7" The Allen majority7' rejected three
66 Id.
67 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTs § 211 cmt. f (1979).
68 See Angus Medical Co. v. Digital Equip. Corp., 840 P.2d 1024, 1030
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1992).
69 Allen v. Prudential Property and Cas. Ins. Co., 839 P.2d 798 (Utah 1992).
The decision in this case came after a student-written law journal work advocated
the adoption of the Restatement formulation of the doctrine. See Minnock, supra
note 17. The Allen court specifically addressed the arguments made by Minnock.
For an overview and analysis of the events leading up to the decision in Allen,
see Douglas K. Fadel, Comment, Utah Rejects the Reasonable Expectations
Doctrine in Insurance Contract Interpretation, 1993 UTAH L. REv. 275.
70 See, e.g., Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Call, 712 P.2d 231 (Utah 1985) ("We
therefore hold that where the insurer fails to disclose material exclusions in an
automobile insurance policy and the purchaser is not informed of them in
writing, ... the exclusion clause fails to 'honor the reasonable expectations' of
the purchaser.. . ." Id. at 236-37); Wagner v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 786 P.2d 763
(Utah Ct. App. 1990). The Wagner court instituted a three-pronged analysis of
applicability of the doctrine in an individual case: first, the insurer had to have
actual knowledge or it reasonably should have known of the insured's expecta-
tions of coverage; second, the insurer had to be the source of the expectation;
and third, the expectation had to be reasonable. Id. at 766. Compare this
statement of the applicability of the doctrine to that in Gordinier v. Aetna Cas.
& Sur. Co., 742 P.2d 277 (Ariz. 1987). See supra notes 60-67 and accompanying
text for a discussion of the Gordinier case.
71 The Allen majority consisted of three justices. Allen, 839 P.2d at 798.
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separate formulations of the doctrine, including one formulation that
dispensed with a showing of ambiguity as a prerequisite.72 One justice,
concurring in the result, refused to join the majority because of their
outright rejection of the doctrine of reasonable expectations.73 One
justice dissented and would have adopted the Restatement formulation.74
The fact that two of the five justices on the Utah Supreme Court
appeared willing to accept the doctrine suggests that the doctrine has
support in Utah.
3. Iowa
Iowa courts have adopted a form of the doctrine of reasonable
expectations that is like the Restatement formulation, though its scope
may not be quite as broad. The court adopted the doctrine as early as
1973 in Rodman v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.
71
There, the Iowa Supreme Court stated that "[t]he objectively reasonable
expectations of applicants and intended beneficiaries regarding insurance
contracts will be honored even though painstaking study of the policy
provisions would have negated those expectations." '76 This language
implies that, like the Restatement formulation, there is no requirement of
ambiguity as a prerequisite for the application of the doctrine in Iowa.
Notwithstanding the court's statement, the scope of the doctrine is not
quite as broad as the- language from Rodman might suggest. The Iowa
Supreme Court narrowed the application of the doctrine to policy
exclusions that "(1) [are] bizarre or oppressive, (2) eviscerate[ ] terms of
the explicitly agreed to, or (3) eliminate[ ] the dominant purpose of the
transaction." 7 Though this does mimic the Restatement indicators of
terms beyond the reasonable expectations of the parties,78 the Restate-
72 Id. at 803. In Allen, the Court of Appeals had applied the Wagner version
of the doctrine.
73 Id. at 807 (Stewart, J., concurring).
7 Id. at 1047-49 (Durham, J., dissenting) (stating that "the reasonable
expectations doctrine would operate as a 'balancing test,' requiring equilibrium
between the risk of insurer overreaching and the advantages.., of standardiza-
tion and form contracting").
" Rodman v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 208 N.W.2d 903, 906 (Iowa
1973).
76 id.
77 West Trucking Line, Inc. v. Northland Ins. Co., 459 N.W.2d 262, 264-65
(Iowa 1990) (citing Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. v. Sandbulte, 302 N.W.2d 104, 112
(Iowa 1981)).
78 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 cmt. f (1979).
449
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
ment list is not an exhaustive list of terms. It is only a starting place for the
analysis.79 The language of Restatement section 211(3) would allow for any
term beyond any reasonable expectation to be read out of the agreement 8
Therefore, Iowa provides for a form of the Restatement formulation that will
apply to an insurance contract regardless of the ambiguity of the language,
but not to all terms that are patently unreasonable.
C Critique
There are a number of problems with the Restatement approach. Primar-
ily, the Restatement approach is focused on excluding language that is already
in the policy. As section 211 states, it focuses on "particular term[s]" con-
tained in the writing.8" This means that the Restatement is focused on expec-
tations or terms explicitly embodied in the insurance contract Unfortunately,
an insured may have a reasonable expectation of coverage that is frustrated
not because of a "bizarre or oppressive" term or a term that "eliminates the
dominant purpose of the transaction," 2 but rather because the requested
coverage (figured into the premium according to the policy declarations) is
not included at all. For example, one could request that a policy contain
coverage for completed operations damages up to $100,000, but the policy
may not contain the coverage even if the agent promised that it did. The
Restatement approach presumably would not include coverage even if the
insured relied on an erroneous belief that she was already covered by passing
up an opportunity to obtain the requested coverage from another company.
From a loss allocation perspective, it would be reasonable to make the
insurer bear the risk of loss because it created the expectation on the part of
the insured that was not fulfilled.83 Furthermore, the insurer is in a better
position to bear and spread the risk. Unfortunately, the Restatement approach
will not necessarily bring about this result since the Restatement literally
applies only to language in the policy.84
79 See id.
80 See id. § 211(3).
8, Id.
82 Id. § 211 cmt. f.
83 When comparing the relative fault of the company which, through the
actions of its agent, promised coverage that it did not provide in the actual
contract, and of the insured individual, who reasonably did not read the contract
and relied on the representations of the agent, the insurance company is arguably
more at fault since it created the expectation on the part of the individual
insured.
84 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211(3) (1979).
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On the other hand, the Restatement approach of addressing terms in
the policy itself would cut down on judicial drafting. If there is a goal in
the law of encouraging written agreements,85 evidenced by such
contractual rules as the parol evidence rule 6 and the statute of frauds, 7
a special rule that would allow a litigant to circumvent the certainty of a
written agreement by introducing new terms would undermine that goal.
The Restatement strikes an effective balance between protection of
insureds' interests and encouragement of written agreements.
Furthermore, the Restatement is not clear whether the reasonable
expectations of the insured are to be measured by a subjective standard,
an objective standard, or both. The very title "reasonable expectations"
would seem to imply an objective standard based on a reasonable prudent
person (akin to a tort negligence standard), but the language of section
211 ties the expectations to the beliefs of the individual parties to the
contract.88 If the section contemplates a completely subjective standard,
the insured could claim to have any kind of belief whatsoever without
any controls on the claim, and in turn, the insurer could always claim that
it had no reason to believe that the particular party would not have
assented to the term at issue. If there is a completely objective standard
that does not inquire into the mental states of the parties, insurers may be
forced to provide coverage if the term is acceptable on an objective level,
even if the individual insured would have accepted the term if she would
have known of its presence. A combination approach where the belief
must be objectively reasonable and subjectively held would help to cure
these problems, but it is not clear how the Restatement drafters meant to
resolve this problem.89
85 See FARNSWORTH, supra note 5, § 7.2.
86 See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text.
87 See FARNSWORTH, supra note 5, § 6.1. Most generally, the statute of
frauds states that certain types of contracts must be in writing to be enforceable.
See id.
88 This section states: "(3) Where the other party has reason to believe that
the party manifesting such assent would not do so if he knew that the writing
contained a particular term, the term is not part of the agreement." RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211(3) (1979) (emphasis added).
89 The Restatement commentary gives little guidance on this subject.
Comment f to section 211 lists a number of objective tests, such as whether the
term is "bizarre or oppressive," but these are only listed as indicators where the
reasonableness of the insured's belief may be "inferred." Furthermore, the
commentary gives subjective factors, such as a lack of an opportunity to read the
policy, as further support for an application of the doctrine. Id. § 211, cmt. f.
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Notwithstanding these problems, the Restatement approach adequately
addresses the issues that originally drove the creation of the doctrine. This
formulation protects the insured from terms that are vastly unfair and
beyond the scope of any expectation, regardless if the insured read the
contract and regardless if the terms are ambiguous. The Restatement
approach basically fulfills the purpose, underlying the need for a doctrine
of reasonable expectations. There is no detrimental overlap with the
doctrine of ambiguity since the doctrine of ambiguity and the doctrine of
reasonable expectations were created to serve different purposes." The
Restatement doctrine can take up where the doctrine of ambiguity leaves
off, or both doctrines can apply to the same language, at the same time,
to serve different purposes.
III. THE KENTUCKY FORMULATION
Although Kentucky has adopted a version of the doctrine of
reasonable expectations,9" its formulation is fundamentally different than
that promulgated by the Restatement drafters. Kentucky varies most
prominently from the Restatement by requiring a showing of ambiguity
as a predicate to invocation of the doctrine.92 Rather than protecting a
different set of terms for different underlying purposes than the doctrine
of ambiguity, the Kentucky doctrine of reasonable expectations protects
insureds from only a subset of terms already covered by the doctrine of
ambiguity.
93
A. Mechanics of the Kentucky Formulation
1. Genesis of the Kentucky Formulation:
Simon v. Continental Insurance Co.
The Kentucky formulation of the doctrine can be traced back to
Justice Leibson's majority opinion for the Kentucky Supreme Court in
90 See id. § 211 cmt. c-f for a discussion of the purposes of the doctrine of
reasonable expectations, and supra note 19 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the purpose behind the doctrine of ambiguity.
91 See Simon v. Continental Ins. Co., 724 S.W.2d 210 (Ky. 1986).
92 See, e.g., Hendrix v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 823 S.W.2d 937, 938 (Ky.
Ct. App. 1991) (holding that "in the absence of ambiguities or of a statute to the
contrary, the terms of an insurance policy will be enforced as drawn"), review
denied (Ky. Mar. 4, 1992).
93 See infra notes 123-26 and accompanying text.
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Simon v. Continental Insurance Co.94 Simon involved litigation over an
underinsured motorist policy. The insured, Michael Simon, and his
daughter were killed in an automobile accident. His wife, Janet, recovered
a judgment against the other driver in a wrongful death action, but the
tortfeasor was judgment-proof and only carried the statutory minimum for
liability insurance.95
Janet Simon filed an underinsured motorist claim with her own
insurer, Continental Insurance Co., but the insurer disputed the extent of
its liability under the policy.96 Simon's policy stated that it included
underinsured motorist coverage, but the policy itself did not specify the
limits of the insurer's liability under the underinsured coverage. The
policy stated a limit on "occurrence[s]" generally of $100,000, but there
was a separate limit on uninsured coverage of $10,000/$20,000. 97 Simon
claimed that she was entitled to the higher limit on underinsured motorist
coverage since the policy did not state a specific limitation, but the
insurer claimed that the policy limits on the uninsured motorist coverage
should apply to the underinsured portion of the policy since they are
analogous coverages.9" The trial court agreed with Simon and awarded
her the $100,000 limit offset by the $20,000 already paid by the
tortfeasor's insurer.99 The Kentucky Court of Appeals reversed, holding
that the underinsured motorist statute °° did not require that this type of
insurance provide coverage limits coextensive with the outer policy limits
for an "occurrence."
101
The Supreme Court saw this case as involving two issues: interpreta-
tion of the statute and interpretation of the policy. ' 2 The court disposed
of the entire case by interpreting the policy and avoided construing the
94 Simon v. Continental Ins. Co., 724 S.W.2d 210 (Ky. 1986).
9 Janet Simon won a judgment of $104,023 as administrator of her
husband's estate and $40,000 as guardian for her daughter. The other driver's
liability insurance limits were $10,000 per person/$20,000 per accident, and his
insurer paid the limits of the policy. This left a shortfall of $134,023 combined
owed to the Simon family. Id. at 210.
96 I d. at 210-11.
97 id.
981d. at 211.
99 Id.
100 KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 304.39-320 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1996). This
statute requires every insurer operating in Kentucky to offer underinsured
motorist insurance if it is requested by an insured.
"' Simon, 724 S.W.2d at 211.
102 Id.
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statute. °3 In interpreting the policy, Justice Leibson made the first
reference in a Kentucky case to the doctrine of reasonable expecta-
tions.' 4 Leibson described the doctrine as applicable in "deciding
whether an insurance policy is ambiguous, and consequently should be
interpreted in favor of the insured . . . ."' Leibson based his version
of the doctrine in part on a proposal by Professor Keeton'16 and stated
that "'[o]nly an unequivocally conspicuous, plain and clear manifestation
of the company's intent to exclude coverage will defeat [the insured's
reasonable] expectation."" 7 Leibson further explained that "'[t]he
doctrine of reasonable expectations is used in conjunction with the
principle that ambiguities should be resolved against the drafter in order
to circumvent the technical, legalistic and complex contract terms which
limit benefits to the insured.' , 08
Beyond this statement of abstract principles, the opinion otherwise
gives little guidance. The court found the policy ambiguous because the
policy did not state a limit directly on the underinsured motorist policy
statement, and, therefore, construed the policy to maximize Simon's
coverage. The only discussion of reasonable expectations in reference to
these facts was the observation that a reasonable purchaser of underin-
sured motorist insurance would expect full coverage "absent 'an
unequivocally conspicuous, plain and clear manifestation of the compa-
ny's intent to exclude coverage.' 1,,09
2. Subsequent Developments
A series of cases after Simon applied the Kentucky formulation to a
number of different factual situations, all involving insurance disputes.
103 Id. at 212.
104 id.
105 Id. (emphasis added).
10 6 Id. (citing ROBERT E. KEETON, BASIC TEXT OF INSURANCE LAW § 6.3(a)
(1971)). Oddly enough, Keeton actually supported a doctrine which applied when
the language is not ambiguous. See generally Keeton, supra note 9.1'7 Id. (quoting R.H. LONG, THE LAW OF LIABILITY INSURANCE § 5.10B).
'
08 Id. (quoting R.H. LONG, THE LAW OF LIABILITY INSURANCE § 5.10B)
(emphasis added). The language from the Long treatise may be the key to
Kentucky's insistence on an ambiguity before an application of the doctrine. If
only a "plain and clear manifestation of the company's intent to exclude... will
defeat [the insured's] expectation," id., it would stand to reason that an
unambiguous policy would be enforceable under this rationale regardless of the
insured's reasonable expectations.
109 Id. at 213 (quoting LONG, supra note 108).
[VOL. 85
1996-97] THE DOCTRINE OF REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS
Each of the cases emphasize the necessity for a finding of ambiguity
before the doctrine can apply.' In Home Folks Mobile Homes, Inc. v.
Meridian Mutual Insurance Co., the plaintiff was an incorporated
business solely owned by Richard Berry. The corporation had a business
auto policy with the defendant. Berry's daughter was involved in an
automobile accident while driving in a car not owned by a family
member or the business." 2 The Kentucky Court of Appeals applied the
doctrine of reasonable expectations to a "drive other car" provision which
stated "[a]ny auto you don't own is a covered auto while being used by
you or by any family member... ."' ,
The trial court had held that this policy unambiguously "provided
[drive other car] coverage only if the insured was an individual,""..4 and
the insured here was a corporation." 5 When the insured initially bought
the policy he had told the agent that he wanted "full coverage" for both
his business and family." 6 The Court of Appeals reversed, stating that
the mere insertion of a policy endorsement which, on its face, applied
only to individuals, into a policy nominally for a corporation, creates an
ambiguity." 7 This ambiguity opened the door for the court to apply the
110 Note that the requirement of a finding of ambiguity is consistent with the
Kentucky version of the parol evidence rule. Similarly, in Arizona the acceptance
of the Restatement version heralded a change in that state's version of the parol
evidence rule. See supra note 47 for a discussion of Arizona's version. In
contrast to the Corbin approach accepted by Arizona, Kentucky adheres to the
Willistonian version of the rule, which requires that language be clearly
ambiguous on its face (i.e., a patent ambiguity) for extrinsic evidence to be
admissible. This has clearly and detrimentally controlled the development of the
doctrine of reasonable expectations. If there is no facial ambiguity, then an
insured cannot introduce evidence to explain her reasonable expectation. For a
statement of Kentucky's parol evidence rule, see, for example, Woodward v.
Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 239 S.W.2d 267, 269 (Ky. 1951).
"' Home Folks Mobile Homes, Inc. v. Meridian Mut. Ins. Co., 744 S.W.2d
749 (Ky. Ct. App. 1987).
112 Id. at 749.
13 Id. at 750.
114 Id.
115 .d.
116 Id. at 749-50.
117 The Court of Appeals' interpretation of ambiguity is indicative of the
problem of courts bending the doctrine to fit the ends the court is trying to
achieve. Kentucky holds to a strict Willistonian definition of ambiguity and the
parol evidence rule, which means that the policy language itself would have to
be patently ambiguous in order for a court to invoke the doctrine of ambiguity.
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doctrine of reasonable expectations. The court stated that "the insured
could reasonably expect the endorsement was meant to extend such
coverage to members of the [insured's] family. The 'doctrine of
reasonable expectations' is one, as explained in Simon, appropriate for
resolving such ambiguities."' 1 8
Later that same year the Kentucky Supreme Court explicitly discussed
the doctrine's relation to the doctrine of ambiguity in Woodson v.
Manhattan Life Insurance Co."9 The court referred to the doctrine of
reasonable expectations as a "corollary to the rule for construing
ambiguities"'20 and reiterated the holding of Simon.' The trend of
requiring ambiguity continues throughout the remainder of the reported
Kentucky cases interpreting run-of-the-mill insurance contracts. All of
these cases either explicitly or implicitly require a showing of ambiguity
before the doctrine can be invoked in a particular case. 2
This court seemed willing to go out of its way in order to find an ambiguity that
would support what it saw as the "correct result For a discussion of the Kentucky
version of the doctrine of ambiguity, see supra note 30 and accompanying text
18 Home Folks, 744 S.W.2d at 750.
... Woodson v. Manhattan Life Ins. Co., 743 S.W.2d 835 (Ky. 1987). The
main dispute in this case was not over an interpretation of the policy; rather, it
was over whether, as a matter of fact, the insured's conduct came within the
leave of absence exception to the termination clause of the insured's life
insurance. Id. at 836-38.
120 Id. at 839.
121 Id. The court quoted the language that the Simon court relied on from
LONG, supra note 108. See supra notes 94-109 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the Simon case.
122 See James Graham Brown Found., Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins.
Co., 814 S.W.2d 273, 279 (Ky. 1991) (stating in the context of the doctrine of
ambiguity that "it cannot be accepted as a fact that parties in good faith intended
to bargain for insurance that paid no benefits"); Hendrix v. Fireman's Fund Ins.
Co., 823 S.W.2d 937, 941 (Ky. Ct. App. 1991) (refusing to apply the doctrine
of reasonable expectations to create a duty on behalf of blanket excess liability
insurers to check the insured's other policies to see the extent of coverage offered
under their policies since the parties bargained to allocate the risk of loss; no
allegations were made of ambiguity in that allocation); Moore v. Commonwealth
Life Ins. Co., 759 S.W.2d 598, 599 (Ky. Ct. App. 1988) (stating that courts
"must define an insurer's liability according to the terms and conditions of the
policy" but that under the doctrine of reasonable expectations, the insured "is
entitled to all the coverage he may reasonably expect to be provided under the
policy"). But see Lewis v. West Am. Ins. Co., 927 S.W.2d 829, 833-34 (Ky.
1996) (plurality opinion) (invalidating household exclusions on public policy
grounds); Hamilton v. Allstate Ins. Co., 789 S.W.2d 751, 753 (Ky. 1990) and
Chaffin v. Kentucky Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 789 S.W.2d 754, 757 (Ky. 1990)
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3. The Current Kentucky Formulation
Under the rules set out in the foregoing cases, the application of the
Kentucky doctrine can be boiled down to a two-question test: (1) is there
an ambiguity? and (2) is the insured's interpretation one that can be
reasonably attributed to the language of the policy?' 3 This second
analysis may involve many of the same questions involved in the
Restatement analysis.'24 Like the Restatement version, the Kentucky
formulation may best be understood graphically.
Figure 2
1. Contractual terms to which the
doctrine of ambiguity applies.
2. Contractual terms to which
both the doctrine of ambiguity
and the doctrine of reasonable
expectations apply.
(companion cases holding unambiguous policy exclusions void as a matter of
public policy because they violated the uninsured motorist statute). Though these
cases explicitly apply the doctrine of reasonable expectations to unambiguous
contract language, the analysis in each case focuses more on broad public policy
implications than on the nature of the policy language. In fact, Hamilton and
Chaffin only nominally mention Simon, and Lewis cites only to Hamilton and
Chaffin for the doctrine of reasonable expectations. In the average interpretative
case that does not implicatebroad public policy concerns, the normal requirement
of a showing of ambiguity would apply.
.23 See, e.g., Simon v. Continental Ins. Co., 724 S.W.2d 210,211-12 (Ky. 1986).
124 See supra notes 4-8 and accompanying text for a list of typical consider-
ations under the Restatement formulation of the doctrine. See also Brown, 814
S.W.2d at 273 (applying as an indicator of an unreasonable term as one that
gives the insured none of the bargained-for benefits).
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The Kentucky formulation of the doctrine works as a subset of the
doctrine of ambiguity. In order for the doctrine to apply, the court must
first find that the language is ambiguous; this means that necessarily the
doctrine of ambiguity applies to any term Kentucky would analyze under
the doctrine of reasonable expectations. Beyond that, it is not clear
whether Kentucky would then treat the ambiguous term any different
from one to which the doctrine of reasonable expectations would not
apply (since the doctrine of reasonable expectations only applies to
insurance agreements). Unlike the Restatement, Kentucky has never
stricken a term from a policy document. Courts have merely given the
terms the best interpretation possible in conjunction with the rest of the
policy. 1
25
The Kentucky version is even more restrictive when viewed in
conjunction with the Kentucky form of the parol evidence rule. The
definition of ambiguity is governed by the parol evidence rule, and
Kentucky adheres to the restrictive Willistonian interpretation of
ambiguity. Therefore, Kentucky will only construe a term against the
drafter if it is patently ambiguous.'26
B. Critique
The Kentucky doctrine is supported by the policy that courts are not
in the business of rewriting contracts. A court may try to interpret the
terms so as to benefit one of the parties, but it should not draft a new
document.' 2 The Kentucky version of the doctrine clearly does not
violate this rule of judicial restraint. This is the only real argument in
favor of the Kentucky formulation, and the Restatement version does not
truly violate the rule that the Kentucky formulation upholds. A court
cannot add terms under the Restatement; it can only cross them out. 28
.2 See, e.g., Hendrix, 823 S.W.2d at 938 ("Under the 'doctrine of reasonable
expectations,' an insured is entitled to all the coverage he may reasonably expect
to be provided according to the terms of the policy.") (emphasis added).
126 See, e.g., Moore v. Commonwealth Life Ins. Co., 759 S.W.2d. 598, 599
(Ky. Ct. App. 1988). For a more detailed discussion of the parol evidence rule
and its interaction with the doctrine of ambiguity, see supra notes 26-28 and
accompanying text.
127 See, e.g., Moore, 759 S.W.2d at 599 ("[T]he courts cannot make a new
contract for the parties to an insurance contract. However, restrictive interpreta-
tion in a standardized adhesion contract.. . is not favored.") (citations omitted).
128 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACrS § 211(3) (1979).
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Therefore, under the Restatement, there is no unfettered judicial discretion
and no substantial judicial drafting.
Plainly stated, the Kentucky formulation completely fails to fulfill the
reasons behind the institution of the doctrine of reasonable expectations
due to Kentucky's insistence on a prerequisite showing of ambiguity. A
prerequisite showing of ambiguity would completely undermine one of
the very purposes behind the doctrine - the failure of the doctrine of
ambiguity to adequately address the problems of inability of insureds to
read the policy. Professor Robert Keeton, in one of the first major articles
outlining the reasons for the doctrine, stated the reasons for the doctrine
in terms of the failure of the doctrine of ambiguity to address problems
in the insurance context:
This ought not be allowed even though the insurer's form is very
explicit and unambiguous, because insurers know that ordinarily
policyholders will not in fact read their policies. Policy forms are long
and complicated and cannot be fully understood without detailed study;
few policyholders ever read their policies as carefully as would be
required for moderately detailed understanding.129
The requirement of ambiguity presupposes that the insured read the
contract and would have been so confused by the term that he would not
have known the meaning of term. Only then would the penalty of
construing the language against the drafter make sense. But as Professor
Keeton points out, many purchasers of insurance never even have an
opportunity to read the policy before they buy it: "the normal processes
for marketing most kinds of insurance do not ordinarily place the detailed
policy terms in the hands of the policyholder until the contract has
already been made."13 It would be manifestly unfair to require a
policyholder to make a showing of ambiguity in a contractual term before
it may be challenged when the policyholder most likely never had a
chance to read the term before the policy was purchased.
In fact, many courts tried to use the doctrine of ambiguity to fulfill
this perceived need in insurance law, but that attempt was unsuccessful.
In Professor Keeton's research, he summarized the attempts of several
jurisdictions to use the doctrine of ambiguity to address the need:
"Opinions proceeding generally on the theory of resolving ambiguities
against the insurer have often included passages stretching toward but not
129 Keeton, supra note 9, at 968.
130 Id. (emphasis added).
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reaching the broader principle of honoring reasonable expectations."''
Professor Keeton goes on to state: "[T]he principle of resolving ambigu-
ities against the draftsman is simply an inadequate explanation of the
results of some cases. The conclusion is inescapable that courts have
sometimes invented ambiguity where none existed, then resolving the
invented ambiguity contrary to the plainly expressed terms of the contract
document."' For these reasons, Professor Keeton proposed a form of
the doctrine that should not be dependent on ambiguity in the lan-
guage. 3
3
Policyholders need additional protection from insurers, and the
doctrine of reasonable expectations was intended to supply that protec-
tion, regardless of the clarity of the language. The only protection
available to the insured in the Commonwealth of Kentucky is the chance
a court will also find the term ambiguous and then will construe it in
favor of the insured. The Restatement version of the doctrine of
reasonable expectations, along with adhesion contract theory in general,
assumes that the insured does not read the contract and, even if she did,
she would not be able to bargain for any changes in the terms.134 The
requirement of ambiguity completely undermines the underpinnings of the
doctrine so that it is of little use in affording any extra protections to
parties to an adhesion contract.
Kentucky's version is no more than the old doctrine of ambiguity
repackaged under a new name. There is no substantial difference in
application between the two. The doctrine of ambiguity requires a
prerequisite showing of ambiguity, and if this is shown, the court will
give the most reasonable interpretation in favor of the insured to the
language.'35 The Kentucky formulation of the doctrine is applied in an
identical fashion. It just carries a different name in the insurance context.
Since the Kentucky formulation is coextensive with the doctrine of
ambiguity, it will fail to address the problem of insurance companies who
131 Id. at 969.
132 Id. at 972.
'13 "Thus, not only should a policyholder's reasonable expectations be
honored in the face of difficult and technical language, but those expectations
should prevail as well when the language of an unusual provision is clearly
understandable, unless the insurer can show the policyholder's failure to read
such language was unreasonable." Id. at 968.
134 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 cmt. f (1979).
15 See Wolford v. Wolford, 662 S.W.2d 835, 838 (Ky. 1984) (holding that
"[i]f the contract language is ambiguous, it must be liberally construed to resolve
any doubts in favor of the insured").
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overreach in their policies but are clever enough to draft the language
clearly. For example, if the language quoted in the introduction to this
Note'36 worked to the detriment of the reasonable expectations of an
insured in Kentucky, that insured may find no protection from a
Kentucky court since there is a precedent on the books holding that this
language is not ambiguous. 3 7 If Kentucky means to use the doctrine of
ambiguity only, it should do so. If Kentucky means to give purchasers of
insurance an additional protection, as the very use of an interpretive
doctrine other than the doctrine of ambiguity in the Simon decision 38
implies, then it should formulate a version of the doctrine that gives these
parties a true additional protection. The Restatement formulation
effectively fulfills the justifications for the doctrine of reasonable
expectations which are separate from those for the doctrine of ambiguity.
CONCLUSION
Kentucky should adopt the formulation of the doctrine of reasonable
expectations embodied in the Restatement. At the very least, Kentucky
needs to drop the requirement that the insured must make a prerequisite
showing of ambiguity since it undermines the very reasons courts initially
decided to develop the doctrine. It is well established that insurance
customers do not read their policies, and contrary to usual contract law,
they are not legally expected to do so.' 39 Given the disparate bargaining
power between insurance companies and their customers, 4 ' , it is not
unreasonable that courts have developed a tool to keep insurance
companies in line. The Restatement version balances the need for
binding, enforceable agreements with the need to fulfill the reasonable
expectations of insurance customers when buying the policies at issue.
Notwithstanding the judicial promise in Simon v. Continental Insurance
'36 See supra note 1 and accompanying text. The author does not mean to
imply that this typical contractual language would necessarily be contrary to the
reasonable expectations of an individual insured. The author does think, however,
that this language is sufficiently vague and convoluted to give a typical insurance
customer difficulty in determining what coverage she actually has.
137 See Biebel Bros., Inc. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 522 F.2d
1207, 1209, 1211 (8th Cir. 1975).
138 Simon v. Continental Ins. Co., 724 S.W.2d 210, 212-13 (Ky. 1986)
(holding that "the insured is entitled to all coverage he may reasonably expect
to be provided under the policy").
131 See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
40 See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text.
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Co.'4' that Kentucky Courts will protect the reasonable expectations of
the insured, Kentucky's version of the doctrine provides little or no
additional protections for insurance buyers in the Commonwealth of
Kentucky beyond the doctrine of ambiguity Kentucky should now fulfill
what has turned out to be an empty promise of an additional tool for
protecting the interests of the insured and drop the prerequisite require-
ment of a showing of ambiguity
141 Simon, 724 S.W.2d at 212-13.
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